OECD\u27s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision And Extension To More Economies by Koyama, T. & Golub, Stephen S.
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Economics Faculty Works Economics 
12-1-2006 
OECD's FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision And 
Extension To More Economies 
T. Koyama 
Stephen S. Golub 
Swarthmore College, sgolub1@swarthmore.edu 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
T. Koyama and Stephen S. Golub. (2006). "OECD's FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision And 
Extension To More Economies". OECD Working Papers On International Investment. Issue 2006/04. DOI: 
10.1787/112474484663 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/378 
Please cite this paper as:
Koyama, T. and S. Golub (2006), “OECD's FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index: Revision and Extension to more
Economies”, OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, 2006/04, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/112474484663
OECD Working Papers on International
Investment 2006/04
OECD's FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index
REVISION AND EXTENSION TO MORE
ECONOMIES
Takeshi Koyama, Stephen S. Golub
JEL Classification: F21, F23
Investment Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2 rue André-Pascal, Paris 75116, France 
www.oecd.org/investment 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
Number 2006/4 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD's FDI REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX:  
REVISION AND EXTENSION TO MORE ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
 
December 2006 
 
 
 
 
This paper provides a revised measure of regulatory restrictions on inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) for OECD countries and extends the approach to 13 non-member countries. 
The methodology is largely similar to that adopted in the previous version of the OECD 
indicator and covers three broad categories of restrictions: limitations on foreign ownership, 
screening or notification procedures, and management and operational restrictions. 
This paper was prepared by Takeshi Koyama and Stephen Golub. It is also available as 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 525 [ECO/WKP(2006)53]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
Abstract 
 
OECD’s FDI regulatory restrictiveness index: 
revision and extension to more economies 
 
This paper provides a revised measure of regulatory restrictions on inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for OECD countries and extends the approach to 13 non-member countries. The methodology is 
largely similar to that adopted in the previous version of the OECD indicator and covers three broad 
categories of restrictions: limitations on foreign ownership, screening or notification procedures, and 
management and operational restrictions. The FDI restrictiveness indicator captures statutory deviations 
from "national treatment", i.e. discrimination against foreign investment. When combined with other 
factors having an influence on foreign investment decisions, it has proven to be a good predictor of 
countries' inward FDI performance.   
 
 
JEL classification: F23, F21 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, FDI restrictions, foreign ownership 
 
*********** 
 
L'indice OCDE des restrictions réglementaires sur les investissements en provenance de 
l'étranger: Révisions et extension à plus de pays. 
 
Ce document présente une mesure révisée des restrictions réglementaires envers les influx des 
investissements directs étrangers (IDE) pour les pays de l'OCDE et étend la mesure à 13 pays 
non-membres. L'approche est dans son ensemble similaire à celle adoptée lors de la version antérieure de 
l'indicateur de l'OCDE, et couvre essentiellement trois catégories de restrictions: les limites sur la part de 
firmes domestiques pouvant être détenues par le capital étranger, les procédures d'examen sélectif et de 
notification, et les restrictions concernant la gestion et les opérations des entreprises. L'indicateur de 
restrictions réglementaires mesure les déviations par rapport au "traitement national" c'est-à-dire les 
discriminations à l'encontre des investissements étrangers. Combiné à d'autres facteurs ayant une 
influence sur les décisions d'investissement à l'étranger, cet indicateur contribue à expliquer la 
performance des pays en matière d'influx des IDE.  
 
 
Classification JEL: F23, F21 
Mots-clefs: Investissement direct étranger, restrictions sur l'IDE, contrôle étranger  
 
 
 
 
Copyright OECD, 2006 
Application for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material should be made to: Head of 
Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. 
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OECD’S FDI REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX: 
REVISION AND EXTENSION TO MORE ECONOMIES 
Takeshi Koyama and Stephen Golub1 
Introduction 
1. This document provides revised measures of the OECD's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Regulatory Restrictiveness Index for 29 OECD countries,2 and extends the approach to nine non-member 
countries adhering to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia) and four other major 
non-OECD countries (China, India, Russia and South Africa).   
2. The methodology is largely similar to that adopted in the previous versions of the indicators 
(see Annex 1). The analysis is based primarily on information generated by the OECD – in particular 
through the work of the Investment Committee in the context of the implementation of the Code of 
Liberalisation of Capital Movements (OECD, 2004a) and the National Treatment Instrument for Foreign 
Controlled Enterprises (OECD, 2005c), OECD reports on international investor participation in 
telecommunications and infrastructure sectors, the OECD Investment Policy Reviews of Russia and 
China (OECD, 2003b; OECD, 2004b), and OECD Investment Dialogue with India .3 As in the previous 
version of the indicators used for the Index, GATS schedules of commitments – dating back to 2000 – 
were additional sources of information for certain services sectors and for certain countries.4 National 
sources were also consulted, especially for non-member countries, such as China, India , Russia  and 
South Africa. It was beyond the scope and resources of the present exercise, however, to systematically 
review national sources for all countries.   
3. The validity of the results is therefore primarily dependent on the accuracy of the information 
available to the OECD. To avoid that information is incorrect or out of date, the thirty-nine OECD and 
non-member countries adhering to the National Treatment Instrument (NTI) assisted in obtaining more 
                                                 
1.  The authors are Takeshi Koyama, who was principal administrator in the OECD Investment Divis ion 
when this paper was prepared, and Stephen Golub, who is a consultant in the Economics Department and 
Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College, USA (email: sgolub1@swarthmore.edu). They would 
like to thank Alain de Serres in the OECD Economics Department and Blanka Kalinova in the OECD 
Investment Division for their help in preparing the paper. 
2.  The previous OECD estimates are reported in Golub (2003), and were also published in OECD (2003a) 
and in OECD Economic Surveys for several countries. The previous OECD indicators covered 28 
member countries. The Slovak Republic has now been added.  
3.  The information used is based on regulatory developments as of April 2006 and does not take into 
account further liberalisation measures announced but not entered into force by that time.  
4.  GATS-based information was only used in the instances where it covered country and sector specific 
regulatory aspects not fully documented in country positions under OECD instruments.  
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accurate information. The Index will be improved and updated in light of new development and 
additional information. 
Explanatory note and results 
4. The indicators aim primarily to measure deviations from “national treatment”, i.e. 
discrimination against foreign investment, rather than the institutional environment more generally. 
Regulations of labour and product markets and other policies that apply equally to foreign and domestic 
investors are not considered here, with the exception of state monopolies. Restrictions on national 
treatment can be classified into entry and post-entry operational restrictions. The indicators take into 
consideration discriminatory barriers to entry in the form of limitations on foreign ownership, special 
screening procedures which only apply to foreign investors, as well as post-entry management and other 
operational restrictions. FDI regulatory restrictions can either be across-the-board, applying to all sectors, 
or sector-specific. The limitations on foreign equity levels are usually specified on an industry-by-
industry basis, whereas discriminatory authorisation requirements are often across-the-board.5  
5. Restrictiveness is measured on a 0-to-1 scale, with 0 representing full openness and 1 a 
prohibition of FDI. Given their evident importance, ownership restrictions receive a substantial weight. 
Restrictiveness is calculated at the industry level and then a weighted OECD national average is obtained 
using the weights, based on the sectoral composition of overall FDI and trade flows of OECD countries.  
6. The Index covers only 9 sectors and 11 sub-sectors. Because opportunities for investment in 
energy, such as oil and gas, vary considerably across countries depending on their natural endowments, 
energy other than electricity is not covered by the Index. The exclusion of other primary sectors, such as 
mining, may distort countries’ relative restrictiveness indicators. Future developments of the Index will 
consider extension to more sectors. The share of primary sectors, though, is modest in the OECD area, 
and the impact of such an extension on the overall country ranking under the Index is unlikely to be 
large. Annex 1 provides more details of the methodology and the weighting system.   
7. There are a number of important qualifications regarding the reported FDI regulatory 
restrictiveness scores. The measures are limited to overt regulatory restrictions on FDI, ignoring non-
policy institutiona l or informal restrictions, such as the nature of corporate governance, as well as 
policies that indirectly impinge on FDI, notably economic and social regulation. Also, the extent of 
actual enforcement of statutory restrictions is difficult to determine and was not factored into the 
calculations. The stringency implied by screening requirements could be particula rly variable across 
countries. Moreover, some countries may be more forthcoming than others in self-reporting their 
restrictions. It could then be that more transparent countries receive higher scores, not because their 
regulations are in fact more restrictive, but because they are more complete in their reporting of 
regulatory restrictions. In some federal countries, certain sectoral regulations on composition of 
companies' boards of directors fall under sub-national government jurisdiction. Variations across 
countries in the extent to which nationality requirements are imposed may not be reflected in scorings 
based primarily on federal laws. Finally, reported regulatory restrictions are not standardised and there 
                                                 
5.  The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements defines a foreign direct investment as an 
"investment for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations with an undertaking such as, in 
particular, investment which give the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the 
management". Accordingly, mechanisms which allow foreign acquisitions of non-voting shares and 
other forms of portfolio investment (as opposed to FDI), for example in air transport, have not been 
factored in measuring FDI restrictiveness levels.  
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are difficulties in evaluating idiosyncratic restrictions in individual countries and putting them into 
context.   
8. The Index used in isolation is not an adequate predictor of countries’ FDI attractiveness. 
However, when used in combination with other factors, it can contribute to explaining variations among 
countries in attracting FDI.6 Despite their limitations, these measures have proved useful both for 
policymakers and researchers interested in assessing policies towards FDI.  
9. Table 1 shows the summary results by sector for 29 OECD member countries and 
13 non-member countries. Figure 1 shows the results, breaking the aggregate regulatory restrictiveness 
score into ownership, screening, and operational components. 
10. Among OECD countries, the most open countries tend to be in Europe. Since the late 1980s, 
intra-European Union (EU) FDI flows are almost completely unrestricted, and the European Economic 
Area (EEA) has also liberalised intra-bloc investment to some extent.7 In addition, a number of European 
countries have minimal overt restrictions on inflows from non-EU and non-EEA countries. Although the 
EU is still not a completely unified bloc in terms of policies towards inward FDI, substantial 
harmonisation and intra-EU liberalisation have occurred. The OECD countries with the highest levels of 
overall regulatory restrictiveness are Iceland, Mexico, Australia, Austria and Canada, with overall 
regulatory restrictiveness scores above 0.20.  
11. There is greater variation in the regulatory restrictiveness of the non-member countries. Some 
of the non-members, notably most of those in Eastern Europe as well as Chile and Argentina have rather 
low regulatory restrictiveness scores. Others, in particular China, India and Russia  have relatively high 
scores. On average, the non-OECD countries are a little more restrictive than the OECD countries, as 
shown by the last few columns in Table 1.  
12. The pattern of restrictions by industry is broadly similar across countries. The most restricted 
sectors are electricity, transport, telecommunications and finance. Manufacturing, tourism, construction 
and distribution are generally less restricted. There are some differences between the OECD and 
non-OECD countries, however. In particular, transport and tourism are relatively less restricted in 
non-OECD countries, while electricity, distribution and finance are rela tively highly restricted in 
non-OECD countries.  
13. The new results should not be compared directly with the results published for the first time in 
2003 for the purpose of assessing liberalisation trends. Indeed, many changes in the reported scores do 
not result from revisions in policies, but from changes in the sources of information.8 The new index also 
uses a slightly modified methodology (see Annex 1). Annex 2 presents estimates of changes in policies 
between 1998-2000 and 2005, after controlling for these alterations in information and methods. 
 
                                                 
6.  See, for example, Golub (2003) and Nicoletti, et al. (2003). 
7.  European scores are scaled down in cases when intra-European preferences are in effect.  
8.  In particular, reports by the European Commission, the US Trade Representative and Japan’s Ministry of 
Economy and Trade on the practice of other countries have no longer been used, and more systematic 
use of country positions under OECD investment instruments has been made. 
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Table 1.  FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Scores by Country and Sector (1 = closed, 0 = open)  
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Czech 
Republic
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy
Legal 0.250 0.348 0.022 0.200 0.125 1.000 0.550 0.233 0.022 0.462 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Accounting 0.250 0.348 0.022 0.200 0.375 0.562 0.550 0.033 0.022 0.506 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Architecture 0.200 0.348 0.022 0.150 0.050 0.022 0.110 0.033 0.022 0.462 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Engineering 0.200 0.348 0.022 0.150 0.050 0.022 0.110 0.033 0.022 0.462 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Total 0.225 0.348 0.022 0.175 0.150 0.432 0.330 0.083 0.022 0.473 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Fixed 0.700 0.172 0.072 0.525 0.050 0.072 0.110 0.072 0.122 0.122 0.200 0.266 0.122 0.072
Mobile 0.200 0.172 0.072 0.525 0.050 0.072 0.110 0.072 0.122 0.122 0.100 0.266 0.122 0.072
Total 0.575 0.172 0.072 0.525 0.050 0.072 0.110 0.072 0.122 0.122 0.175 0.266 0.122 0.072
0.200 0.172 0.022 0.150 0.100 0.022 0.110 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
0.200 0.172 0.022 0.150 0.050 0.022 0.110 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Insurance 0.200 0.272 0.044 0.200 0.150 0.044 0.110 0.138 0.116 0.088 0.150 0.266 0.088 0.088
Banking 0.300 0.172 0.044 0.225 0.150 0.022 0.160 0.094 0.072 0.088 0.100 0.442 0.044 0.144
Total 0.277 0.195 0.044 0.219 0.150 0.027 0.149 0.104 0.082 0.088 0.112 0.401 0.054 0.131
0.200 0.172 0.022 0.150 0.050 0.022 0.110 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
Air 0.650 0.322 0.122 0.675 0.450 0.422 0.310 0.198 0.248 0.522 0.500 0.398 0.466 0.494
Maritime 0.500 0.472 0.248 0.300 0.100 0.022 0.210 0.198 0.198 0.254 0.400 0.266 0.066 0.066
Road 0.200 0.222 0.072 0.250 0.100 0.122 0.154 0.072 0.022 0.022 0.150 0.266 0.022 0.022
Total 0.486 0.369 0.169 0.413 0.217 0.176 0.232 0.171 0.177 0.294 0.380 0.310 0.190 0.199
0.200 0.172 0.022 0.350 0.450 0.122 0.210 0.322 0.122 1.000 0.200 1.000 1.000 0.122
0.200 0.172 0.022 0.150 0.050 0.022 0.110 0.072 0.022 0.022 0.100 0.266 0.022 0.022
0.280 0.242 0.052 0.228 0.122 0.131 0.180 0.094 0.063 0.187 0.153 0.309 0.078 0.073
Business service
Telecoms
Construction
Electricity
Manufacturing
TOTAL
Distribution
Finance
Hotels & Restaurants
Transport
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Table 1 (cont'd)  FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Scores by Country and Sector (1 = closed, 0 = open) 
Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands
New 
Zealand Norway Poland Portugal
Slovak 
Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United 
Kingdom
United 
States
Legal 0.100 0.075 0.150 0.011 0.125 0.405 0.225 0.022 0.075 0.512 0.556 0.175 0.250 0.017 0.075
Accounting 0.100 0.075 0.425 0.011 0.125 0.405 0.175 0.066 0.375 0.066 0.292 0.100 0.150 0.017 0.025
Architecture 0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.075 0.022 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
Engineering 0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.075 0.022 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
Total 0.063 0.063 0.206 0.011 0.125 0.230 0.138 0.033 0.150 0.156 0.245 0.119 0.150 0.017 0.038
Fixed 0.286 0.400 0.425 0.011 0.480 0.055 0.375 0.122 0.072 0.322 0.166 0.200 0.100 0.017 0.025
Mobile 0.025 0.400 0.150 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.375 0.122 0.072 0.322 0.166 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
Total 0.221 0.400 0.356 0.011 0.391 0.055 0.375 0.122 0.072 0.322 0.166 0.175 0.100 0.017 0.025
0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.072 0.022 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.072 0.022 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
Insurance 0.025 0.050 0.425 0.055 0.125 0.105 0.075 0.116 0.172 0.226 0.116 0.100 0.100 0.083 0.175
Banking 0.075 0.050 0.525 0.033 0.125 0.105 0.325 0.172 0.172 0.182 0.116 0.110 0.150 0.067 0.275
Total 0.064 0.050 0.502 0.038 0.125 0.105 0.268 0.159 0.172 0.192 0.116 0.108 0.150 0.070 0.252
0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.072 0.022 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
Air 0.675 0.350 0.625 0.411 0.574 0.155 0.375 1.000 0.372 0.304 0.316 0.500 0.500 0.267 0.650
Maritime 0.275 0.450 0.425 0.355 0.225 0.455 0.075 0.122 0.122 0.316 0.266 0.594 0.500 0.361 0.275
Road 0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.355 0.125 0.022 0.072 0.022 0.166 0.150 0.100 0.017 0.025
Total 0.356 0.333 0.428 0.301 0.320 0.334 0.185 0.434 0.194 0.250 0.262 0.469 0.416 0.256 0.346
0.025 0.400 1.000 0.611 0.225 0.155 0.175 0.122 0.322 0.022 0.166 0.400 0.400 0.017 0.125
0.025 0.050 0.125 0.011 0.125 0.055 0.075 0.022 0.072 0.072 0.066 0.100 0.100 0.017 0.025
0.101 0.120 0.278 0.074 0.170 0.144 0.151 0.120 0.128 0.140 0.147 0.174 0.173 0.065 0.119
Manufacturing
TOTAL
Electricity
Business services
Telecoms
Construction
Distribution
Finance
Hotels & Rest.
Transport
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Table 1 (cont'd)  FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Scores by Country and Sector (1 = closed, 0 = open) 
Argentina Brazil Chile Israel Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovenia China India Russia
South 
Africa
OECD 
Average 
Non-OECD 
Average
All  Average 
Legal 0.125 0.100 0.125 0.150 1.000 0.000 0.050 0.250 0.125 0.300 1.000 0.175 0.125 0.221 0.271 0.239
Accounting 0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.125 0.425 1.000 0.175 0.125 0.196 0.175 0.191
Architecture 0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.100 1.000 0.175 0.125 0.094 0.148 0.110
Engineering 0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.100 0.050 0.175 0.125 0.094 0.075 0.087
Total 0.125 0.100 0.050 0.075 0.272 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.113 0.231 0.863 0.175 0.125 0.152 0.175 0.160
Fixed 0.125 0.200 0.025 0.250 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.200 0.550 0.350 0.400 0.650 0.198 0.229 0.196
Mobile 0.125 0.200 0.025 0.250 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.100 0.450 0.350 0.350 0.600 0.143 0.206 0.152
Total 0.125 0.200 0.025 0.250 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.150 0.175 0.525 0.350 0.388 0.638 0.184 0.223 0.185
0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.250 0.200 0.150 0.074 0.098 0.080
0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.450 0.600 0.100 0.150 0.072 0.140 0.092
Insurance 0.125 0.150 0.025 0.050 0.122 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.350 0.450 0.850 0.350 0.135 0.206 0.152
Banking 0.175 0.400 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.100 0.175 0.100 0.550 0.350 0.550 0.250 0.157 0.211 0.172
Total 0.164 0.343 0.025 0.050 0.045 0.000 0.089 0.146 0.100 0.504 0.373 0.619 0.273 0.152 0.210 0.167
0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.050 0.100 0.100 0.072 0.071 0.071
Air 0.125 0.600 0.475 0.550 0.322 0.132 0.350 0.750 0.740 0.550 0.550 0.600 0.250 0.443 0.461 0.454
Maritime 0.175 0.200 0.575 0.150 0.366 0.000 0.094 0.150 0.244 0.550 0.050 0.400 0.250 0.280 0.246 0.270
Road 0.425 0.600 0.345 0.050 0.022 0.100 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.050 0.200 0.300 0.106 0.188 0.128
Total 0.211 0.416 0.494 0.261 0.279 0.065 0.169 0.327 0.377 0.466 0.215 0.424 0.261 0.299 0.305 0.302
0.125 0.100 0.025 0.650 0.622 1.000 0.650 0.450 0.700 0.750 0.150 0.750 1.000 0.326 0.536 0.376
0.125 0.100 0.025 0.050 0.022 0.000 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.400 0.200 0.230 0.200 0.076 0.119 0.086
0.145 0.195 0.107 0.109 0.127 0.030 0.087 0.132 0.162 0.405 0.401 0.318 0.234 0.148 0.189 0.159
Finance
Hotels & Restaurants
Transport
Business services
Telecoms
Construction
Distribution
Electricity
Manufacturing
TOTAL  
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Figure 1.  Nine-sector FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness by Type of Restriction* 
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 *This aggregated Index covers the following sectors and sub-sectors: Business (legal, accounting, architectural, and engineering services), Telecommunications (fixed line telephony 
and mobile telephony), Construction, Distribution, Finance (insurance and banking), Tourism, Transport (air transport, maritime transport and road transport), Electricity and 
Manufacturing. 
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Figure 2.  Regulatory Restrictiveness by Industry, OECD and Non-OECD Average 
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ANNEX 1 
OECD’S METHODOLOGY FOR COMPUTING FDI REGULATORY RESTRICTIVENESS9 
The Index covers the following sectors and sub-sectors: Business (legal, accounting, architectural, and 
engineering services), Telecommunications (fixed line telephony and mobile telephony), Construction, 
Distribution, Finance (insurance and banking), Tourism, Transport (air transport, maritime transport and 
road transport), Electricity and Manufacturing. 
Regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership are the most obvious barriers to inward FDI. They 
typically take the form of limiting the share of companies’ equity capital in a target sector that non-
residents are allowed to hold, e.g. to less than 50%, or even prohibit any foreign ownership. Obligatory 
screening and other discriminatory approval procedures can also be used to limit FDI though their actual 
constraining effects depend on the implementation of such practices. Stipulations that foreign investors 
must show economic benefits can increase the cost of entry and therefore may discourage the inflow of 
foreign capital. Prior approval of FDI, such as mandated for all FDI projects in a few OECD countries, 
could also limit foreign capital inf low if it is taken as a sign of an ambivalent attitude towards free FDI, 
even though it may not be vigorously enforced.  
Other formal regulatory restrictions that can discourage FDI inflows include constraints on the ability 
of foreign nationals either to manage or to work in affiliates of foreign companies and other operational 
controls on these businesses. Stipulations that nationals or residents must form a majority of the board of 
directors may undermine foreign owners’ control over their holdings and hence make them more hesitant 
to invest under such circumstances. Similarly, if regulations restrict the employment of foreign nationals, 
investors may judge that they cannot make use of the necessary expertise to make their investment 
worthwhile. Also, operational requirements, such as the restrictions vis-à-vis non-members on cabotage in 
air, road, or maritime transport may limit profits of foreign-owned corporations, and hence the amounts of 
funds foreign investors are willing to commit.  
Table A1 presents the scoring system used to calculate the overall regulatory restrictiveness indicators 
for each industry and country based on regulations in each of the three areas: equity, screening and other 
restrictions. The total score ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 being completely open and 1 being completely 
closed.  
The ownership restrictions are weighted highly in view of the fact that foreign ownership is a 
necessary and essential condition for FDI. In the case of a ban on foreign ownership, other restrictions 
become irrelevant.10 The ownership scores in Table A1 are constructed so as to capture non-linearities in 
ownership restrictions as well as the inverse relationship between permissible foreign equity share and 
restrictiveness. Screening and limitations on management are generally less important. Also, 
non-linearities are built into the scoring system to reflect the conjecture that a total ban on foreign 
ownership is significantly more restrictive than allowing a small foreign equity stake. Restrictiveness is 
                                                 
9.  For more details and discussion see Golub (2003) and Hardin and Holmes (1997, 2002). 
10. The Index is capped at 1. As may be inferred from Table A1, it is possible that the component restriction 
scores could sum to up to more than 1 even if foreign equity is not banned, without the cap.  
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calculated at the industry level and then a weighted national average is obtained using FDI and trade 
weights (see Table  A2). The same set of sector weights is used for all countries. While these weights may 
not precisely reflect the composition of FDI or output in some countries, a uniform set of weights 
establishes a common basis for comparing countries’ overall scores. OECD and non-OECD average 
restrictions are simple averages of country scores.  
As noted earlier, the focus is on departures from national treatment rather than regulatory barriers 
hampering market access for both domestic and foreign firms. However, an exception is made for state 
ownership , including state monopoly or near-monopoly, as government monopoly is in effect a de facto 
ban on FDI. Industries reserved for the government are scored as though ownership is banned. Where 
government ownership was determined to be greater than 50% in key industries, such as 
telecommunications, electricity and transport, a partial ownership restriction was imputed. 11   
Where restrictions on intra-European investments are waived, European restrictions are weighted by 
0.44, reflecting the fact that 56% of FDI inflows into European countries were intra-European in 1998, 
though not all EU countries have the same share of intra-European FDI. This could overstate the effect of 
the waiver to the extent that this waiver endogenously raises the share of intra-European FDI. 
The methodology used in computing this new Index differs slightly from the one used in the previous 
study. Ex post notification requirements for foreign investments for statistical and commonly accepted 
purposes are no longer considered a regulatory restriction. Also, the weight on partial state ownership has 
been lowered. 
The sources of information used also differ from the ones used in the previous study. In particular 
reports by the European Commission, the US Trade Representative and Japan’s Ministry of Economy and 
Trade on the practice of other countries and private consulting firm reports have no longer been used, and 
more systematic use of country positions under OECD investment instruments has been made. This change 
in sources has affected significantly the position of Japan, United States and Korea in particular. 
Country files will be made available on the OECD website (www.oecd.org/eco/pmr). 
                                                 
11.  Data availability on state ownership is  limited for most sectors. For other industries, notably air transport, 
telecoms and especially electricity, where more data on state ownership are available, the restriction score 
was calculated as follows:  
State ownership share score 
State monopoly 1.0 
Privatisation under way 0.6 
90% or more  0.4 
75-90%  0.2 
Majority 0.1 
 
 These scores are based on the consideration that partial state ownership by itself is not necessarily a major 
impediment to increasing foreign investment whereas state monopoly by its very nature precludes foreign 
investment.  
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Table A1.  Coefficients on FDI restrictions (maximum 1.0) 
 Scores  
Foreign Direct Equity Investment Limits  
No foreign equity allowed 1 
1 to 19 % foreign equity allowed 0.6 
20-34% foreign equity allowed 0.4 
35-49 % foreign equity allowed 0.3 
50-74% foreign equity allowed 0.2 
75-99% foreign equity allowed 0.1 
Screening and Approval 
 
Investor must show economic benefits 0.2 
Approval unless contrary to national interest 0.1 
Notification 0.05 
Other Restrictions 
 
Board of directors/Managers   
majority must be nationals or residents 0.1 
at least 1 must be national or resident 0.05 
must be locally licensed 0.025 
Movement of people 
 
no entry 0.1 
less than one year 0.075 
one to two years 0.05 
three to four years 0.025 
Input and Operational Restrictions  
 
domestic content must be more than 50% 0.1 
other 0.05 
Total* Between 0 and 1 
* If foreign equity is banned, then the other criteria become irrelevant, so that the Index is at 1.0. It is 
possible that various scores sum to slightly more than 1.0 even if foreign equity is not banned, and in 
such cases, the Index is also capped at 1.0. 
Table A2.  Sector weights 
Sectors FDI/trade weights 
Business  0.192 
Telecommunications  0.041 
Construction 0.021 
Distribution 0.094 
Finance 0.163 
Tourism 0.004 
Transport 0.164 
Electricity 0.019 
Manufacturing 0.302 
Total 1.000 
Note: Using FDI weights raises a problem of endogeneity: Highly restricted sectors may 
experience less FDI and hence receive a too low  weight. To deal with this problem, for 
the service sectors, an average of FDI and trade weights was employed. Aggregating 
sectoral FDI restrictions by using FDI weights rather than value-added weights tends to 
slightly lower most countries’ restrictions scores. 
Source: Golub, 2003. 
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ANNEX 2 
CHANGES IN POLICIES 1998/2000-2006 
Figure A1 shows changes in policies in OECD member countries from 1998-2000 to 2006 as 
measured by reductions in foreign equity ownership ceilings. Consistent with the standstill obligation 
undertaken by members under the OECD instruments, there have not been any cases identified where such 
ceilings have been raised over the period considered. The majority of OECD countries have experienced 
relatively minor changes in policies towards FDI as shown by the small changes in regulatory restriction 
scores. Turkey undertook the most significant liberalisation of equity restrictions, leading to a decline of its 
regulatory restrictiveness score of close to 0.1. Poland, Mexico, the Czech Republic, France and Canada 
experienced moderate reductions in their respective scores of 0.05 to 0.03. A number of other countries 
also liberalised their ownership restrictions slightly. 
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Figure A1.  Reductions in the FDI Restrictiveness Indices 
due to decreases in foreign equity ownership restrictions, 1998/2000-2006 
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